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1. Introduction
This paper reviews the types of business models, or land-
use models, being implemented in land reform projects 
involving the transfer of rural land to communities and 
other groups in South Africa, under both the restitution and 
redistribution programmes. It draws heavily on the series 
of Diagnostic Studies prepared as part of the Sustainable 
Development Consortium’s (SDC) work on post-settlement 
support, but also draws from other studies on restitution, 
notably that conducted by the Community Agency for 
Social Enquiry (CASE) in 2005, and the wider literature on 
redistributive land reform in South Africa.
The aim of this paper is ﬁrst to identify the types of business 
model emerging within land reform, and to analyse 
how they have been implemented and the implications 
for sustainable development and poverty alleviation. The 
subject matter inevitably overlaps with other thematic 
papers in this series, particularly that on livelihoods, but 
focuses speciﬁcally on the business models and aims to avoid 
repetition of issues discussed in more detail elsewhere.
A critical issue facing any review of land reform in South 
Africa, and commented on by many other authorities, is 
the very limited progress made with any productive land-
use across all types of land reform. The vast majority of 
restitution projects, in particular, have not achieved their 
developmental aims. The CASE study of 2005–06 stated the 
problem thus:
 Of the 128 projects with agricultural developmental 
aims, 83 percent have not achieved these developmental 
aims. Approximately nine percent (12) have partially 
achieved their agricultural developmental aims but are 
not generating any income. A further ﬁve percent have 
partially achieved their agricultural developmental aims 
and are generating income. However, these ﬁve percent of 
projects are not making a proﬁt and are not sustainable 
yet. Two percent have achieved their agricultural 
developmental aims and are generating minimal proﬁts 
that are reinvested. Thus, only one project (of a total of 
128) has attained its agricultural aims and is generating a 
substantial and sustainable proﬁt.1 
Similar underachievement is recorded for housing, mining, 
tourism and other activities on restored land. Concerns have 
also been raised by various authorities, including the former 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, about 
the underperformance and even collapse of redistribution 
projects in many parts of the country.2
In a review of the livelihood impact of selected case studies 
in restitution, the SDC found that settled claims were 
generally failing to deliver signiﬁcant beneﬁts of any sort to 
the members of community claims:
 The most striking ﬁnding from the case studies is that the 
majority of beneﬁciaries across all the restitution projects 
have received no material beneﬁt whatsoever from 
restitution, in the form of cash income, or access to land. 3
In other words, there remains an enormous gap between 
the ambitious promise of settlement agreements and 
the reality on the ground. This gap has been attributed 
to a range of factors, and the recurring issues can be 
summarised as follows: inadequate or unrealistic planning 
at the time of settlement; little or no assessment of the 
needs (or capacities) of claimants; lack of skills and capital 
on the part of claimants; slow release of grants from the 
regional ofﬁces of the Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights (CRLR) and other government bodies; lack of post-
settlement support from the CRLR; and difﬁculties accessing 
a range of state support services, most notably those of the 
provincial departments of agriculture, the Department of 
Minerals and Energy Affairs and local municipalities. While 
there are a number of notable success stories, particularly in 
the areas of eco-tourism and some high-value agricultural 
1  Community Agency for Social Enquiry. 2006. Assessment of the status quo of settled land restitution claims with a developmental component nationally. 
14 February, p. 21.
2  Farmer’s Weekly. 2005. Didiza offers reasons for Limpopo failures. 18 November.
3  Sustainable Development Consortium. 2006. The impact of land restitution and land reform on livelihoods. Thematic paper. Programme for Land and 
Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, and Sustainable Development Consortium.  August,  p. 16.
Photo: Marc Wegerif
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production, these stand in stark contrast to the majority of 
settled claims where little or no productive activity is taking 
place and few if any beneﬁts have yet come to intended 
beneﬁciaries. 
The slow progress with most settled claims also means 
that any conclusions about the merits of particular models 
can only be tentative at this stage, and will involve a 
considerable degree of speculation. Much more time will be 
required before more deﬁnitive conclusions can be drawn. 
Nevertheless, the available evidence from both successful 
and less successful ventures provides valuable lessons that 
can be applied in future settlement of claims and in land 
reform more generally.
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2. The range of business models 
in land reform
Land reform takes a wide variety of forms, depending on the 
land reform programme involved, the type of land and the 
size of the beneﬁciary group. For purposes of this paper, the 
discussion will be limited to the restoration or other transfer 
of rural land which is intended to be used for agriculture, 
forestry, eco-tourism, mining or similar land-based activities. 
Housing settlements, and small business developments 
that are not land-extensive in nature, are deliberately 
excluded on the basis that they would require a separate 
and more specialised discussion that involves wider issues 
of government policy and the economic environment. 
The business models adopted, or planned, in land reform 
projects have two main dimensions: ﬁrstly, the type of 
land-use, be it agricultural, conservation, mining or other; 
and secondly, the form of socio-economic arrangements 
associated with that land-use. The socio-economic 
arrangements may include direct participation of members 
in agriculture, employment as workers in a commercial 
venture, or receipt of a share of proﬁts via a communal 
property institution (CPI) without any direct involvement in 
land-use. Where members have direct access to the resource, 
socio-economic arrangements may vary considerably: for 
example, a decision to use land for agricultural production 
may result in sub-division of land to individual households, 
collective production by the CPI (or a sub-group within 
it), or some form of partnership with an external party 
(for example, a strategic partnership). The socio-economic 
arrangements are of great importance not only in how land 
is accessed and used, but also in the distribution of beneﬁts 
to members, especially in cases where beneﬁts are indirect 
and channelled through a CPI.
Four broad models of land-use can be identiﬁed from the 
emerging literature on land reform, which cut across the 
various economic sectors of agriculture, forestry, tourism, 
conservation and mining. They are as follows:
1. Individual (or household) access to land, typically 
for small-scale agricultural production and natural 
resource harvesting.
2. Group access to, or control of, land (by either the entire 
CPI or a sub-group within it), typically for larger-scale 
agricultural production or tourism activities.
3. Joint ventures with external parties (that is, non-
members of the CPI), to engage in a range of agricultural 
or tourism activities.
4. Contractual arrangements with external parties, 
whereby effective control of some or all of the resource 
is handed over for a speciﬁc period of time, with little 
or no direct involvement by CPI members, in return for 
some form of payment (for example, rental, share of 
proﬁts, etc.).
These four categories are clearly abstractions, and overlap 
between them is often found in speciﬁc cases, for example, 
in the case of eMpangisweni in KwaZulu-Natal, where a 
portion of the restored land is farmed on a commercial basis 
and the remainder is open to individuals for settlement and 
small-scale farming. Categories 3 and 4 also tend to overlap, 
the main distinction being the degree of involvement by 
community members in day-to-day activities. For example, 
in the case of the Zebediela citrus estate, in Limpopo, 
production is effectively in the hands of an external strategic 
partner, but the community holds shares in the operating 
company and a limited number of community members are 
involved either as workers or managers on the estate. Despite 
these limitations, this schema offers a way of thinking about 
business and land-use models in land reform projects from 
both functional and socio-economic perspectives, and 
in terms of production and distribution of beneﬁts. It will 
be employed here as a means of interrogating the broad 
business models currently prevailing within land reform in 
terms of their ability to bring resources into productive use 
and to generate a ﬂow of beneﬁts for members. 
Individual production
Of the categories outlined above, Category 1, individual 
(or household) access to land for small-scale agricultural 
production and natural resource harvesting, is the least 
common (or least acknowledged) with the restitution 
process. Virtually all settlement agreements and business 
plans for restored land tend towards unitary models of land-
use, whereby the claimant community is expected to use 
the resource as a single unit of production, either directly 
through the CPI itself or indirectly through a relationship 
with an external party. Klipgat in North West Province, 
Ximange in Limpopo, and Makhoba on the Eastern Cape–
KwaZulu-Natal border, are typical examples of plans to 
engage in collective production which have failed to cater 
to the needs of the claimant community, and which have 
seen the emergence of ‘informal’ individual, small-scale 
farming. In this bias against small-scale farming, restitution 
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shares much in common with other programmes of land 
reform, notably the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant 
(SLAG) programme up to about 2001, Land Redistribution 
for Agricultural Development (LRAD) since 2001, albeit to a 
lesser extent, and even recent experiments in Mpumalanga 
whereby groups of labour tenant families are being resettled 
on specially purchased farms, without formal sub-division.
While collective processes may be a logical choice where 
the resource clearly needs to be managed as a single unit of 
production, as at Zebediela citrus estate or the Makuleke and 
Dwesa-Cwebe claims on conservation areas, what is perhaps 
surprising is the predominance of collective solutions on 
relatively undeveloped agricultural land, where sub-division 
and individual (or household) forms of production would 
be a feasible alternative. The point here is not to make a case 
for smallholder production at the expense of other models, 
but to raise critical questions around the widespread bias 
against smallholders and individualised production and the 
failure to give this model serious consideration even in cases 
where it is feasible, demanded by community members and 
likely to generate more immediate beneﬁts for more people 
than unitary or ‘commercial’ models. 
Some individualisation of land-use would appear to have 
many advantages, given the type of resources being 
restored and the typical skills, assets and livelihood needs 
of community members. Individualisation of production, in 
the agricultural context, would have the added advantages 
of allowing immediate access to land, and thus to livelihood 
beneﬁts, for those members who desire it, without being 
dependent on other members of the community. It would 
also reduce the need for ongoing collective processes 
around access to resources, organisation of production, 
payment of bills and distribution of beneﬁts which are 
proving so complicated and controversial in many land 
reform projects. 
Nevertheless, the option of individualisation has been 
strongly discouraged and is absent (or unacknowledged) 
in the vast majority of settlement agreements and business 
plans. This may in part stem from a feeling within claimant 
communities, in particular, that they share a common 
destiny and want to return to their land ‘as a community’. 
But whether this is driven by a genuine desire to engage 
in collectivist forms of enterprise, or by a perceived need 
to conform to conventional models being promoted by 
state agencies and commercial farming interests, is an 
open question. Many members of claimant communities 
already engage in some form of agricultural production, or 
run small businesses, which tend to be overwhelmingly on 
an individual or household basis. This suggests that there 
is no predisposition towards collective activities beyond 
the restitution claim process itself, which can be seen as a 
unique (and time-bound) event that requires communities 
that lost land as a group to claim as a group. The transition 
from claiming as a group to running productive activities as 
a group, is not, however, an inevitable one. The widespread 
promotion of collectivist solutions suggests that the 
explanation for this trend lies not with communities 
themselves, but in a generalised bias against individual 
landholding and small-scale agriculture among policy 
makers and implementers.
The evidence for such bias is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Staff of 
the ofﬁces of the Regional Land Claims Commission (RLCC), 
provincial ofﬁces of the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) 
and, perhaps most obviously, provincial departments 
of agriculture, actively discourage sub-division (even 
informal sub-division) of land and household agricultural 
production. Small-scale agriculture is routinely disparaged 
as ‘subsistence’ or ‘expansion of the communal areas’, 
something to be guarded against at all costs. Within the 
provincial departments of agriculture, in particular, great 
emphasis is placed on the ‘protection’ of agricultural 
resources (i.e. the soil), but this is linked to speciﬁc models 
of commercial agriculture, as supposedly practised by white 
commercial farmers. This bias is neatly captured by the 
MEC for Agriculture in Limpopo, and echoed by numerous 
extension ofﬁcers in her department when faced with 
resource-poor farmers, that ‘farming is a business’ – with the 
implication that those who cannot run a business should 
not have access to land.4 In many cases, the bias against 
smallholder agriculture and the imposition of ‘whole farm’ 
solutions is most actively advocated by private consultants 
appointed by the RLCCs to prepare land-use and business 
plans, who tend to understand their brief to be the 
preparation of a conventional ‘farm plan’, along commercial 
lines, and typically have no experience of alternative 
– small-scale, low-input – forms of agriculture. The great 
irony, of course, is that there is little congruence between 
the idealised model of a ‘commercial’ farm, under a single 
entrepreneurial owner, and the reality of a large group of 
relatively poor, poorly skilled and risk-averse people, with 
complex livelihood strategies and little or no tradition of 
working as a group.
4 Limpopo Department of Agriculture. 2005. Budget Speech. 26 April.
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Examples of individualisation do exist, however, both 
planned and unplanned, which suggests that this model 
should be more widely applied if the ofﬁcial bias were 
relaxed and communities given more freedom of choice. 
At Munzhedzi, in Limpopo, differences between the elected 
communal property association (CPA) committee and the 
traditional headman led to community members effectively 
‘invading’ their own restored land and sub-dividing it into 
‘traditional’ homesteads of approximately 0.5 to 1 ha, 
this being sufﬁcient space for an extended household, a 
vegetable garden and a cattle kraal. Roughly half the total 
land is reserved for communal grazing and arable ﬁelds 
for those who are interested. Signiﬁcantly, no productive 
activities are collectivised – rather, households are 
expanding the types of activities they previously practised 
in the communal areas. 
On the nearby Ximange claim, tensions within the 
community have led to competing models of land-use. The 
CPA committee, dominated by urban-based professionals, 
co-operated with the RLCC and a private consultant to 
develop a land-use plan based on a ‘commercial’ mixed-
farming model, under a farm manager, with no direct access 
to land for community members. Poor and unemployed 
members of the community, residing adjacent to the 
restored land, were more interested in gaining access to 
small plots for production of food crops and, due to lack 
of progress with the ‘ofﬁcial’ plan, moved onto the land, 
elected their own informal committee and allocated 
themselves plots of up to 1 ha each. Clearly, the needs 
of these two different groups diverged greatly, and it is 
unfortunate that the CPA committee seemed to represent 
only the interests of the better-off in agreeing to the model 
of land-use being promoted by the RLCC and its appointed 
consultants. The community members currently on the land 
ﬁnd it impossible to access the outstanding grants held by 
the ofﬁce of the RLCC, which insists on working only with 
the ofﬁcial CPA committee and supporting activities that 
conform with the ‘ofﬁcial’ land-use plan. The fact that the 
CPA has not held a general meeting in over three years, that 
the committee members rarely visit the farm, and that most 
community members were not involved in the preparation 
of the land-use plan, indicates a breakdown of the institution 
and poses a question mark over the accountability and 
representivity of the current committee and the model of 
land use it stands for.
Elsewhere in the country, examples of individual production 
are hard to ﬁnd, especially within the ‘ofﬁcial’ literature. 
Examples of individual production were found as part of 
this study at eMpangisweni in KwaZulu-Natal, and Klipgat 
in North West, but in these cases it falls outside the ofﬁcial 
planning processes, and remains largely unsupported by 
ofﬁcial agencies in terms of extension services or grants. 
Only at Covie, in the Western Cape, is sub-division of 
land, and individualisation of production, being actively 
considered within the formal planning process. This can 
be attributed to a history of individual production on the 
claimed land but also the active involvement of community 
members and supportive non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in a highly participatory planning process that goes 
far beyond the usual level of planning and participation in 
most land reform projects. 
Although the production of sugarcane in KwaZulu-Natal is 
undergoing considerable restructuring, including provision 
of land to relatively small individual producers under LRAD, 
this model does not seem to have inﬂuenced restitution in 
that province.5 Of eight settled restitution cases identiﬁed 
by CASE that planned for sugarcane production, all were 
proceeding on the assumption that production would 
be on the unitary (i.e. collectivist) model. In one case, Vusi 
Oakfort, a sugarcane ‘plantation’, was being established from 
scratch with assistance from the Tongaat-Hulett company 
– seemingly contradicting the wider trend in the industry 
towards smaller scales of production. 
Individual or household control of production offers many 
beneﬁts to members of community claims, not least in 
terms of immediate access to land for food production 
and other livelihood activities. It also appears to be an 
appropriate and sustainable development model, given the 
relatively low skills and capital resources available to most 
members. Unitary, collectivist models of production appear 
to be promoted largely by ofﬁcial agencies, along with 
certain members of communities who believe they stand to 
beneﬁt more from such models or whose identity as leaders, 
in touch with government agencies such as the RLCCs, 
causes them to endorse what is proposed ‘from above’. Even 
where unitary solutions are capable of delivering beneﬁts, 
the available evidence suggests that these activities take a 
long time to become operational and even longer to deliver 
beneﬁts to the members. When they do, these beneﬁts are 
extremely limited when divided among large communities, 
and opportunities for training and employment are usually 
accessible to only a minority of younger and better-
educated individuals. The persistent demands for individual 
access to land, largely ignored in ofﬁcial planning processes, 
and the widespread recourse to individual production in 
5 SA Sugar Journal. 2003. Inkezo: Land reform initiative. December 2003/January 2004.
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the shadow of faltering collectivist models, suggests that 
this model deserves greater attention within ofﬁcial policy, 
even as an interim solution while more ambitious plans 
take time to become operational. At the same time, there 
is a need for a realistic assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of collectivist models, and how these can be 
given the support they need to function effectively where 
they are appropriate. Where possible, consideration should 
be given to the combination of individual and collective 
enterprises in order to make maximum use of the land 
resources available and to spread the beneﬁts as widely as 
possible.
Group access to land for large-
scale agriculture
Collective use of land by claimant community themselves, 
with minimal involvement of outsiders, has been the 
dominant model of land-use in settled restitution claims to 
date. It has also been a feature of many large SLAG projects 
initiated prior to 2001. This can be seen as a business model 
of sorts but, in practice, the business element has often 
either failed to get off the ground or actually involves only 
a small proportion of the community members. Thus, there 
may be considerable discrepancy between the ‘ofﬁcial’ 
version of what is happening within a restitution project 
and the reality on the ground. When considering nominally 
collective enterprises, it is also necessary to distinguish 
between the operational aspects of running a farm or 
tourism business and the manner in which beneﬁts (for 
example, jobs, a share of proﬁts) are distributed among 
the community, as ‘collective ownership’ does not always 
translate into ‘collective beneﬁt’. Furthermore, collective 
forms of land-use require equal investment of time and other 
resources by the members, or a means of acknowledging 
different levels of investment, both of which are difﬁcult to 
manage in practice.
Agriculture is the most common type of land-use within land 
reform, and is the most likely type for claimants to approach 
as a group. The emphasis on agriculture is not surprising, 
given the nature of the land involved (typically rural land 
previously used for agriculture) and the characteristics of 
land reform beneﬁciary groups (typically dominated by 
rural people with limited education and skills, and pressing 
needs to acquire food and generate cash income). Thus, 
both positive and negative factors inﬂuence the choice of 
agricultural production – on the positive side, the land is 
available and suitable, and people often have the necessary 
skills and experience to farm; on the negative side, people 
may lack the resources and skills necessary to engage in 
alternative land uses.
The emerging evidence from settled restitution claims, and 
from land reform in South Africa more generally, highlights 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of the collective 
model, and provides lessons both for further development 
of the model and for alternative approaches.
As reported above, the CASE studies of settled restitution 
claims in 2005–06 found that the vast majority had failed 
to deliver signiﬁcant beneﬁts to their members through 
agriculture. Various explanations are offered for this, of 
which the most important appear to be inappropriate and 
inadequate business planning,  poor co-ordination of support 
services (including delays in release of grants) by the CRLR, 
inadequate capital for investment and production, and lack 
of organisation among claimant communities themselves. 
To this might be added the harsh competitiveness and 
marginal proﬁtability of the commercial agricultural sector, 
but as few projects have yet achieved commercial scales 
of production, such real-world challenges have not yet 
fully manifested themselves. Cases where production has 
started, even on a limited scale, point to the challenges of 
the group production model.
At eMpangisweni, for example, development to date has 
centred on the continued operation of a single commercial 
farm, more or less in the form it was taken over from the 
previous owner. Little development has occurred on the 
other extensive land although there is considerable informal 
sub-division (through the tribal council) and household 
farming which effectively falls outside the business plan 
developed for this community. Production has been 
maintained, and even expanded, on the commercial portion, 
largely on the basis of grants obtained from the DLA and 
the provincial Department of Agriculture. A professional 
farm manager (not a member of the community) has been 
employed to run the commercial operation, reporting 
directly to the chair of the eMpangisweni Trust. To date, the 
commercial faming operation has not made a proﬁt, and 
has not been in a position to distribute any beneﬁts to the 
community members. The main beneﬁts to the community 
thus far have been in the form of employment on the farm, 
but even this may be in jeopardy if further external funding 
is not available and the business fails to break even in the 
near future. 
At Groenfontein in Mpumalanga, and Klipgat in North 
West Province, plans for collective agriculture have failed 
to get off the ground. At Groenfontein, the community 
at ﬁrst leased its land to a white commercial farmer (the 
former landowner), and more recently has agreed to lease 
the land to a small group of its own members. This group 
is experiencing predictable delays in accessing capital and 
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starting production, but even if they succeed, the beneﬁts 
to the wider community in the form of rental income will be 
minimal. At Klipgat, vague plans for collective production of 
maize and sunﬂowers, cattle farming and a range of small, 
intensive projects ranging from broilers to cut ﬂowers have 
failed to get off the ground, the only exception being a 
piggery which is still at an early stage of development. A 
diverse range of envisaged non-agricultural activities, such 
as a general dealer, a tourist shop at the snake park, a toilet 
paper factory and others, have also – somewhat predictably 
– failed to materialise. Klipgat offers a clear case of a failure 
to move beyond wish-lists (which cannot by any standards 
be described as business plans) towards more concrete 
planning and implementation, but also the failure by any 
of the institutions involved to conceptualise economic 
activity as anything other than a group activity for the entire 
community. There can be little doubt that this emphasis on 
centralisation and collective action is acting as a deterrent 
to productive use of assets restored under restitution. 
A notable exception to this general trend is the Mangethe 
restitution case in KwaZulu-Natal.6 Here, the community 
appears to have engaged successfully in collective 
production of sugarcane, paying salaries to a substantial 
workforce over a period of three years with minimal 
support from external agencies. It is not possible to explain 
the apparent success of this case on the basis of the limited 
information available, but factors which may contribute to 
it include the following:
• focus on a crop (sugarcane) which is well-established 
in the area, familiar to the members, and for which a 
ready market exists nearby
• competent service providers assisting with business 
planning and formation of a Trust
• well-organised Trust committee that meets twice 
monthly and oversees all aspects of production
• general meetings of the community four times a year
• settlement of numerous community members on the 
land
• purchase of necessary agricultural equipment from 
grants provided by the Commission on the Restitution 
of Land Rights (CRLR) – Settlement Planning Grants 
(SPGs) and Restitution Discretionary Grants (RDGs)
• employment of a professional manager.
Clearly, many of these factors also exist in other, less 
successful, projects, so their presence alone does not explain 
why this project is managing to produce while others are 
not. Nevertheless, it does suggest that, under favourable 
circumstances, communities can engage in proﬁtable 
production as a group. Perhaps one lesson that can be 
drawn here is that a successful enterprise (particularly a 
collective enterprise) requires a range of factors to come 
together in a positive manner, but, as the evidence from 
restitution demonstrates, the chances of failure are much 
greater than of success. 
One other example of a relatively successful collective 
enterprise under land reform is the Vuki farm project 
(formerly known as Whitehall) in the Grabouw area of the 
Western Cape. Vuki is a redistribution project, and generally 
described as a share equity scheme, but given that the 
members own all the shareholding, and all work on the 
project, it is more accurately described as a collective farm 
or workers’ co-operative. As such, it conforms to the model 
of collective land-use projected by numerous restitution 
settlement agreements, but rarely achieved in practice.7
Vuki farm may be considered successful in the sense that 
it produces on a scale comparable to other commercial 
farms in the area, it employs a substantial labour force, it is 
considered creditworthy by a range of ﬁnancial institutions 
(based on projections of proﬁtability over the medium to 
longer term), all debts and liabilities – including wages and 
social welfare contributions – are serviced on schedule, 
and it appears to be ﬁnancially sustainable. Beneﬁts to the 
members of the Vuki project are in the form of wages (and 
salaries for the directors), dividends (if and when there is 
a proﬁt, and after loans have been repaid), housing and a 
range of social beneﬁts, including investment in education 
and social security for worker-shareholders. Vuki farm 
would appear to be a land reform success story, in that a 
failing farming enterprise has been turned around and now 
appears to be in better ﬁnancial shape than it was for many 
years. 
For restitution, Vuki holds a number of potential lessons. 
Firstly, in spite of owning a valuable land asset, members 
have little expectation of obtaining either dividends or 
rental income (i.e. returns to land or capital). Secondly, the 
most that the majority of workers can hope for is a job at 
slightly above the statutory minimum wage, with social 
beneﬁts somewhat above the industry average. A number 
of managerial positions have been created which pay 
6 Community Agency for Social Enquiry. 2005. Assessment of the status quo of settled land restitution claims with a developmental component in KwaZulu-Natal.
7  Information on Vuki farm is based on the unpublished report, Land reform, farm employment and livelihoods: Western Cape case study: Theewaterskloof 
Local Municipality, by Karin Kleinbooi, Edward Lahiff and Boyce Tom, presented  at the  ‘Land, Memory, Reconstruction and Justice: Perspectives on Land 
Restitution in South Africa’ conference, Cape Town, 13–15 September 2006.
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substantially better, and this small group could be seen as 
the principal beneﬁciaries of the project but, like the general 
workers, these people are earning a wage income (i.e. a 
return to labour) rather than receiving either rental income 
or dividends. The beneﬁts of ownership, therefore, are 
effectively limited to more-or-less guaranteed employment 
(as long as the enterprise remains commercially viable) and 
a say in the running of the company, although in practice 
Vuki is run more like a commercial company than a workers’ 
co-operative. The only other beneﬁt arising speciﬁcally from 
ownership is on retirement, when a member’s share in the 
company is compulsorily bought out by the remaining 
members, thereby generating a s igniﬁcant one-off pension 
payout. If similar principles were applied to community 
restitution cases on high-value commercial farms, it would 
suggest that material beneﬁts would be limited to those 
obtaining employment, either in management or in the 
general workforce; that considerable access to capital 
and professional management skills would be required 
to operate along commercial lines; and that beneﬁts for 
distribution to the wider (non-employed) community 
membership may not materialise for many years, if ever. 
Another key distinction between Vuki and the agricultural 
contractual relations discussed below is that, in the case of 
Vuki, 100% of the ownership and control of the company, 
and all its assets, remains in the hands of the members. 
Finance is raised largely through commercial banks and, 
while this brings a degree of obligation and dependency, it 
does not equate to the effective loss of operational control 
as found in the strategic partnership model, or to the sharing 
of proﬁts represented by certain joint ventures.
While the choice of agriculture as a form of land-use may 
be obvious, the particular business models adopted in 
most restitution cases are much less so. The dominance of 
collective models can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including pressure from ofﬁcials and business planners to 
maintain the ‘commercial’ nature of the farming enterprise, 
the lure of commercial farming as source of cash income, 
and an apparent assumption on the part of many claimant 
communities that because they claim as a group they must 
use the restored land as a group. It is the argument of this 
paper that the promotion of commercial agriculture by 
ofﬁcials and planners as an ideal is the main reason behind 
the prominence of this type of land-use. 
It is worth considering, however, the inﬂuence of equity 
considerations as well. A single, centralised enterprise offers 
the possibility of continued control of the resource by the 
community as a whole, and the promise (if not the reality) of 
an equal distribution of beneﬁts to all community members. 
A decentralised or differentiated model, whereby some 
members would be allocated land for housing, some for 
agricultural use, and some for small business development, 
for example, opens up the possibility of unequal outcomes 
and a loss of control by ‘the community’ or, in practice, 
the leadership, as represented by the CPA committee or 
similar. The general failure to conceive of community-based 
restitution as leading to differential outcomes and the 
resulting failure to develop legal or contractual models that 
would decentralise control of resources, leave communities 
no effective alternative to the collective model.
The problem with this, of course, is that the model simply 
does not work much of the time, in that collective enterprises 
fail to get off the ground or, if they do, the beneﬁts to 
members are far less than expected and have a minimal 
impact on livelihoods and poverty. The few ‘success stories’, 
such as eMpangisweni, effectively provide beneﬁts for only 
a small minority of the community, and more often than 
not this ‘beneﬁt’ is the opportunity to work for a minimal 
wage. This paper argues that sub-division of land (even 
informal sub-division) and individualisation of agricultural 
production (to the household level) has the potential to 
be a more inclusive model, that is appropriate to the skills 
and resources of community members and delivers more 
immediate and tangible beneﬁts.
Joint ventures
Joint ventures offer a number of advantages to new 
entrants to the agricultural sector, particularly in terms 
of access to capital, expertise and markets. They may also 
have disadvantages, in terms of sharing of proﬁts and loss 
of autonomy. Each type of joint venture must be critically 
evaluated in terms of its merits.
A search of the available literature suggests that joint 
ventures are rare, to date, in the context of restitution, but 
they are reasonably common in other areas of land reform. 
This may be because joint ventures include cases where 
previously disadvantaged participants do not actually 
acquire land of their own (for example, share equity 
schemes) or where existing land is now used in somewhat 
different ways (for example, contract farming). In this sense, 
joint ventures have tended to focus not on transforming 
land rights, but on new ways of organising production and 
ownership of operating enterprises. Another factor which 
may militate against joint ventures within restitution is the 
emphasis on collective activities and the often ineffective 
systems of decision making within new, community-
based legal entities. Joint ventures tend to be entered into 
between commercial companies (or other institutions) 
and individuals who can commit certain resources to the 
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venture and be held contractually responsible for their side 
of the agreement. 
The scarcity of joint ventures within restitution may reﬂect 
reluctance among commercial operators to enter into 
ventures with poorly organised and often amorphous 
communities that have yet to prove their ability to engage 
in commercial activities. The case of the sugarcane industry 
in KwaZulu-Natal, mentioned above, may be illustrative 
in this regard: various contract-farming agreements have 
been entered into in recent years between the large sugar 
companies and individual growers who obtained land using 
LRAD grants; under restitution, a number of communities in 
the province are producing sugarcane collectively for sale 
to sugar millers, but do not appear to have yet entered the 
type of joint ventures seen under LRAD.
In a review of joint ventures within land reform, Mayson 
identiﬁes a range of partnerships between land reform 
beneﬁciaries and external agencies from either the state 
or private sectors.8 The ﬁve different types of joint venture 
arrangement identiﬁed are: 
1. contract or out-grower schemes
2. share-equity schemes
3. municipal commonage schemes
4. share-produce or sharecropping schemes
5. company-supported schemes. 
Some of these models are not directly relevant to restitution, 
such as share-equity schemes and municipal commonage, 
while sharecropping is virtually unknown. Nevertheless, 
lessons from many of these approaches illuminate the 
challenges and possibilities of joint ventures of various 
kinds which can provide useful guidance for land reform, 
and it is worth considering some of them in detail. 
Contract farming is an agreement between farmers 
and processors or marketing ﬁrms, the basis of which 
is a commitment on the part of the farmer to provide a 
speciﬁc commodity in quantities and at quality standards 
determined by the purchaser and a commitment on the 
part of the company to support the farmer’s production 
and to purchase the commodity. The contract is very 
speciﬁc and generally stipulates how the crop or livestock 
should be produced. The producer (farmer) must supply 
the product to the company at speciﬁed times and the 
price is determined by the quality and quantity of the 
product. This amount is generally ﬁxed as it is assumed 
that the company will carry the risk of marketing. In certain 
industries, however, the prevailing market price at the time 
of sale is used as the contract price. In return, the farmer can 
expect various support measures from the company: the 
commitment to buy the product as well as the provision 
of physical inputs, technical training, accounting services, 
access to credit (often subsidised) and advance payments. 
At the same time, however, the farmers in these schemes 
have little power to determine the terms of the contract, 
which may be exploitative with regard to family labour 
and other matters, especially where the company enjoys 
a monopoly position in the market. Contract farming is 
generally initiated by corporations or companies that want 
to reduce their direct responsibility over particular stages of 
less proﬁtable production. In South Africa, contract farming 
is most common in the sugarcane and forestry sectors. 
Share-equity schemes in agriculture are arrangements 
in which farm workers, small-scale farmers or other 
disadvantaged people buy shares in a commercial farm or 
an agricultural processing company. They may already be 
working on these farms or in these companies, but this is 
not necessarily the case. The shares may be in an already 
existing farm or company, or an investment vehicle may 
be specially established for the purpose. The ability of farm 
workers or small-scale farmers to buy equity comes from 
their access to government subsidies, or through access to 
credit as a result of a long relationship with the company or 
farm. DLA and other government departments such as the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) and the 
private sector are directly involved in share-equity schemes. 
These schemes are most common in the fruit and wine 
sectors, particularly in the Western Cape, but land reform 
grants have also been used to buy equity in eco-tourism, 
small-scale mining and other forms of non-agricultural 
land-uses. Generally, workers and commercial farmers 
establish separate business entities which then join to 
engage in business together. Each commercial farmer and 
group of workers can design their own type, but broadly the 
conﬁgurations differ in terms of the following: 
• The tenure arrangements – who owns the land (the 
commercial farmer or the workers, or both – separately 
or together) and what the tenure ‘relations are.
• The nature of the business on the land and who owns 
it – whether it is individually farmed, jointly farmed, 
and who owns the business.
• The employment relationship on the new farm or 
business and the different roles that farmer and worker 
play in the business.
8  Mayson, David. 2003. Joint ventures. Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. (Evaluating land and agrarian 
reform in South Africa series; No. 7.)
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• In the case of a new farm, what the relationship is to 
the previous farm – whether the workers still work on 
the previous farm, or only on the new farm. 
Investing their state land reform grants in share-equity 
schemes could provide farm workers with a share in an 
asset, an income, and an opportunity far better than any 
other way of investing such a grant. The dominance of white 
farmers, the current lack of involvement of workers in the 
establishment of the schemes, and the lack of alternative 
options presented to them, the risky nature of the schemes, 
the lack of independent access to land, and the lack of 
independent monitoring, however, mean that share-equity 
schemes are the type of joint venture in which the land 
reform beneﬁciaries are most likely to be exploited. This 
necessitates the highest degree of care in designing the 
ventures. If they are to make an important contribution to 
land reform, the planning and monitoring components of 
state involvement must be signiﬁcantly improved. 
Company-supported schemes are joint ventures that 
emerge as a result of a commitment by a large company 
to engage in community upliftment as part of its social 
responsibility programme. Unlike the other joint ventures 
discussed here, these usually do not involve land reform 
grants, or indeed any public funding. These programmes fulﬁl 
a number of purposes for companies. They contribute to the 
development of local people, often linked to the company, 
thereby enhancing staff commitment to the enterprise. At 
the same time, they serve as a marketing tool, showcasing 
the company as one which is concerned about more than 
just making a proﬁt. Benevolent companies appear to 
dominate many company-supported schemes, but there is 
no doubt that they can help to develop the expertise and 
resources of the participants over time. A leading example 
of such a company-supported scheme is Go Organic at 
Spier (GOAS), an organic vegetable farm developed with 
support from the Spier wine estate on 20 ha of commonage 
land leased from Stellenbosch Municipality for 45 years. 
Using a loan obtained from the Khula Land Reform Credit 
Facility, a joint venture was set up which allocated a 27.5% 
shareholding to small-scale farmers, with Spier owning the 
remaining 72.5%. Five farmers drawn into the project were 
given a 5% share in the business. 
Joint ventures involving parties where one is essentially 
a benefactor tend to be extremely complex and often 
contain contradictory elements. On the one hand, the 
access to land, capital and expertise that such arrangements 
make available to small-scale farmers provides a valuable 
opportunity for poor people to overcome many of the 
constraints they face. On the other, providing access to 
resources and the overshadowing role that the ‘benefactor’ 
plays in these relationships can be undermining and can 
establish dependence among beneﬁciaries. 
It is important for companies to strike a balance between 
allowing projects to take their own course and wanting to 
intervene to ensure the success of projects. Maintaining this 
balance through the life of the project, especially when it is 
thought that intervention may save a project, is very difﬁcult. 
Where success is determined entirely by the degree to which 
the project is producing proﬁt, or the project is expected 
to be a showcase for the involvement of the company in 
community development, it is likely that the benefactor 
will be more inclined to intervene. Over-involvement in 
the success of the venture is likely to result in failure. Where 
the long-term sustainable development of independent 
farmers is the aim, it is likely that the benefactor will be less 
likely to intervene. 
In a few parts of the country, municipalities have engaged 
in joint initiatives with landless people, using land and other 
resources available to the municipality in order to promote 
sustainable livelihoods. Many municipalities, especially 
in the Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and 
Free State, hold land which is registered as commonage. 
Commonage is land held by a municipality for the use of the 
local population and which is subject to various conditions 
on its use and disposal. Most often, commonage has been 
used for agricultural purposes. DLA’s municipal commonage 
policy enables municipalities to apply for grants to acquire 
additional land for use by previously disadvantaged 
people.
Photo: Marc Wegerif
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9  Mayson, David, 2003. Joint ventures. Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. (Evaluating land and agrarian 
reform in South Africa series, No. 7.)
Municipalities are well placed to engage in joint venture 
schemes involving small-scale farmers and to embark 
on other land-based development projects. They have 
a particular, constitutionally determined development 
role, they are part of the state, and they have a clear 
understanding of local needs, especially given that all local 
governments are required to have integrated development 
plans (IDPs). While these factors position municipalities well, 
they are also faced with a number of contradictory roles and 
constraints. They must ensure that the development needs 
of residents are met, while at the same time ensuring good 
and responsible use of public funds and resources. It is not 
the role of municipalities to engage in business, but they 
are required to allocate funds to development projects in a 
sustainable way to beneﬁt as many people as possible. 
The most common way that municipalities have dealt with 
small-scale farmers and commonage has simply been to 
supply land for use by the local community. However, some 
municipalities have become more involved by proactively 
creating, funding and supporting initiatives with small-
scale farmers using their position to draw in other actors, 
including white commercial farmers.9
In Sutherland in the Karoo Hoogland district of the 
Northern Cape, the municipality has acquired additional 
land for small-scale farmers through the DLA commonage 
programme. The land is to be used for sheep farming. In 
order to stimulate the development of small-scale farmers, 
the municipality has developed links with a local commercial 
farmer who is willing to assist in preparing the wool, and has 
been active in developing markets for it. The municipality 
plans to provide land in the town where wool could be 
prepared and where the local manufacture of goods, using 
some of the wool, could take place. This scheme is at an 
early stage, but it shows that some municipalities are trying 
to create an enabling environment for development in their 
area of jurisdiction.
In Vredendal, in the Western Cape, the local municipality set 
aside 20 ha of commonage land for people being trained to 
become small-scale farmers, growing grapes and vegetables. 
The criteria for their selection were that the person must be 
physically capable of participating, unemployed or have 
a household income of less than R1,500 per month, must 
be from the historically disadvantaged community and a 
permanent resident of Vredendal. Four full-time small-scale 
farmers formed the Vredendal Saamwerk Boerdery (VSB) 
group, which in turn employs 30 part-time workers.
Increasing recognition of the developmental role of local 
government has meant that municipalities are well-placed 
to leverage funds from other spheres of government. In 
the Matzikama project, committed and well-connected 
municipal ofﬁcials and councillors have ensured that 
grants were obtained for the project rather than leaving 
the farmers dependent on credit. While it is questionable 
whether access to grant capital is replicable on any scale, 
the grants provided the project with the ability to proceed 
without sizable debt, relative to the capital outlay. The 
access to land and other resources that municipalities enjoy 
means that municipalities which are intensively involved in 
joint ventures are often able to make immediate beneﬁts 
available to participants. At the same time, the project’s 
training and mentoring programme has provided the worker 
partners with improved skills in farming and business.
The success of municipal joint ventures depends on 
beneﬁciaries’ ability to control the project and the immediate 
beneﬁts they receive. Providing immediate beneﬁts is 
one key for the success of municipal schemes, but long-
term success depends on the municipality assisting the 
beneﬁciaries to develop their capacity rather than exerting 
a paternalistic form of control.
Women’s land reform interests are often ignored in municipal 
schemes because it is assumed that they are not interested 
in farming. Where municipalities merely lease commonage 
land out, they seldom make provision for women applicants 
to be prioritised. In schemes where the municipality takes 
a more active role, there are better possibilities for giving 
women preferential access, but these are often not pursued. 
The Matzikama project beneﬁciaries included women, but 
the inclusion of women was not speciﬁcally made part of 
the selection criteria. The location of commonage close to 
towns makes it possible for women to use this public land 
while continuing to meet their other responsibilities, but 
the land reform interests of women must be speciﬁcally 
prioritised in municipal schemes.
It is important to note that the capacity of municipalities 
to be able to take on any of these roles is so very often 
limited. Matzikama is a strong municipality with a good tax 
base of powerful agricultural interests, industry and some 
mining. It is therefore able to build up expertise in its own 
administration to pursue development projects. This is not 
common in South Africa – most municipalities have a very 
low tax base and the capacity of the ofﬁcials is extremely 
limited. 
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Joint ventures mobilise private sector and government 
resources to support land reform initiatives in order to 
help poor people overcome the many barriers of entry into 
commercial agriculture. At the same time, commercial farmers 
and corporations are faced with changed circumstances: 
they have to recapitalise to enter the global markets, and 
they have to show their transformation commitments when 
marketing their goods. Commercial farmers and corporations 
use joint ventures to address these changed circumstances, 
but their interests often dominate over those of their smaller 
partners. Where local government is involved, councillors’ 
political interests often dominate the projects. Government 
has not prioritised agrarian reform and has therefore 
allocated a limited amount of resources to it. This means 
that many joint ventures, including government-supported 
projects, allow the conduct of commercial partners to go 
unchecked. Where the government, and DLA in particular, 
is involved, a different, more proactive and determining role 
should be created to ensure that the interests of previously 
disadvantaged men and women are dominant. This means 
initiating more projects, being more prescriptive, and 
monitoring projects once funds have been allocated. If this 
does not happen, state funds for land reform will end up 
bolstering current landowners in agriculture and the poor 
will once again lose out. 
Contractual arrangements 
Contractual relationships, including so-called strategic 
partnerships, have emerged within restitution as a means 
of facilitating the take-over of valuable enterprises 
or the initiation of complex business ventures by 
claimant communities. Contractual relationships may be 
distinguished from joint ventures in that the intended 
beneﬁciaries are not directly involved in production on the 
land in question. Early examples of contractual relationships 
were concentrated in the areas of conservation and eco-
tourism, where claimant communities were effectively 
obliged to continue with existing forms of land-use as a 
condition of having their land restored to them. Leading 
examples are Makuleke in Limpopo, and Dwesa-Cwebe and 
Mkambati in the Eastern Cape. Contractual relationships 
were scarce in the agricultural sector in the early years of 
restitution, which saw highly productive farms restored to 
communities such as Mamahola in Limpopo, and which 
ended in spectacular failure. The perceived need, on the part 
of the Limpopo RLCC and others, to avoid such experiences 
led to the development of the strategic partnership model, 
which is now emerging as the standard form of settlement 
in high-value agricultural land in Limpopo, with other 
provinces likely to follow. 
The ﬁrst such strategic partnership in Limpopo was the claim 
by the Bjatladi community on the Zebediela citrus estate, 
which was settled in 2003. It is currently being implemented 
in the ﬁrst phase of claims at Levubu, where approximately 
5,382 ha of private land, formerly owned by 63 owners, have 
already been purchased at a total price of R219 million. A 
further area of approximately 2,600 ha of state land adjacent 
to Levubu, mostly under forestry, has also been earmarked 
for restoration to three of the claimant communities. The 
claimants in the Levubu cluster are the Ravele, Tshakuma, 
Ratombo, Shigalo, Tshivhazwaulu, Masakona and Tshitwani 
communities.
The strategic partners at Levubu are South African Farm 
Management (SAFM) (also the strategic partner at Zebediela) 
and Mavu Management Services, a company controlled by a 
mix of established white operators in the agricultural sector 
and black partners. Under the new model, the claimant 
community, organised in a CPA, a Trust, or other legal entity, 
takes outright ownership (in freehold title) of the land 
being claimed. Land transfer, and the release of a range of 
state grants, is speciﬁed in a Settlement Agreement signed 
between the beneﬁciaries and the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs, in which the claimant community commits 
to entering a combined shareholding and lease agreement 
with a speciﬁed strategic partner.
The claimant community and the strategic partner 
subsequently form an operating company, in which farm 
workers are also given a small share through a specially 
created farm workers’ trust. Speciﬁc responsibilities and 
rights with regard to this company and its operations 
are spelled out in a shareholders’ agreement and a lease 
agreement between the parties.10 In Levubu, the allocation 
of shares is 50% to the restitution beneﬁciaries (community), 
48% to the strategic partner, and 2% to the farm workers’ 
trust. Proﬁts are to be paid as dividend to shareholders (or 
reinvested in the company) according to their shares. In 
addition to a 50% share in the company, communities are 
to be compensated for the use of their land through the 
payment of rent, set at 1.25% of the land purchase price 
per annum, meaning that the communities may potentially 
receive both dividends (proﬁt) and rent (albeit at well 
below market rates for lease of agricultural land). In a move 
to protect the long-term interest of the community, it may 
neither sell, mortgage nor otherwise put at risk its land. 
10  In advance of ﬁnal settlement of claims, the principal partners at Levubu signed a memorandum of understanding, where the general principles were 
spelled out. This allowed the RLCC to proceed with the drafting of the more detailed agreements.
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While the operating company is jointly owned, the day-
to-day management of the farms will be exclusively in 
the hands of the strategic partner who, in terms of the 
Shareholders’ Agreement, will have full control of all 
ﬁnancial and operational matters. For this, the strategic 
partner charges the operating company a management 
and administrative fee. This fee, combined with salaries of 
key managers provided by the strategic partner, should 
not exceed 8% of the turnover of the operating company. 
Since the restitution programme does not pay for moveable 
property, such as tractors, trucks or pumps, the farms that 
have been transferred no longer have the equipment 
required for agricultural production. This will now have to 
be obtained by the strategic partners, on behalf of the joint 
operating company, either through leasing arrangements 
or through purchase of new machinery.
According to the model, claimant communities will beneﬁt 
through a combination of rental paid on the land, a share 
in proﬁts, training opportunities provided by the strategic 
partner and preferential employment opportunities in the 
enterprise. Although the full value of these beneﬁts, with the 
exception of rent, has not generally been speciﬁed during 
the negotiation phase, there is little doubt that community 
members are expecting signiﬁcant material beneﬁts from 
the restoration of their land and their involvement in the 
business ventures.
For the strategic partner, the beneﬁts lie in the management 
fee (more or less guaranteed as long as turnover can be 
maintained), a share in the proﬁts of the company, and 
exclusive control of upstream and downstream activities, 
with potential beneﬁts exceeding that of the farming 
enterprise itself. Also, by entering into partnerships with 
multiple communities in a speciﬁc area, each owning 
numerous farms, strategic partners have the possibility of 
consolidating and rationalising production in a way that 
was not generally open to the previous owner-occupiers. 
A recent paper by Derman, Lahiff and Sjaastad11 identiﬁed 
a number of critical concerns pertaining to this new model 
that can be summarised as follows:
• Excessive control by the strategic partner, who will 
effectively dominate the board of the new company 
and monopolise all ﬁnancial and operation decisions.
• Guaranteed beneﬁts to the strategic partner, in the 
form of a management fee and control of upstream 
and downstream processes, set against the very limited 
and uncertain beneﬁts accruing to communities in 
the form of dividends (in the event of proﬁt) and 
employment for a few community members.
• Opportunities created for the strategic partners, 
especially at Levubu, to consolidate farms belonging to 
multiple communities, with potential risks for individual 
communities through excessive specialisation, and 
leading to a potential drop in aggregate employment.
• Potentially insurmountable obstacles facing 
communities at the end of the contractual period 
when they effectively have to buy out any investment 
made by the strategic partner.
• The likelihood that substantial numbers of community 
members will receive no beneﬁts whatsoever, at least 
in the short term as employment opportunities are 
limited and both rental and dividend income (if any) 
are likely to be reinvested in the commercial operation 
(as is currently happening at Zebediela).
Strategic partnerships represent a new departure for 
land restitution in South Africa, which presents both 
opportunities and risks for the parties concerned. While 
it is likely that the objectives of land restitution in terms 
of symbolic return of land to its rightful owners and the 
preservation of agricultural production are met, the outlook 
is less encouraging for farm employment, material beneﬁts 
for communities, and effective land rights for individual 
members. The problems and weaknesses inherent in 
the current version of the strategic partnership model 
cannot be blamed entirely on the commercial partners 
themselves who, it can be assumed, are motivated largely 
by proﬁt, with perhaps a dash of altruism. The failure to 
shape the contractual arrangements more closely to the 
needs of the communities involved, and especially their 
poorer members, can in large part be attributed to the 
speed with which the state institutions involved – the 
Limpopo ofﬁce of the RLCC and the provincial Department 
of Agriculture – have developed the model and the lack of 
meaningful consultation with community members around 
its implementation. Lack of capacity within communities, 
and a poor record of democratic decision making, has also 
meant that the intended beneﬁciaries have not been as 
involved in the process as much as they should have been. 
This has manifested itself in a growing divide between some 
community leaders, who are keen to conclude the deals 
with their new partners and take their places on the board 
of directors, and the majority of community members who 
understand little about the process or how they are likely 
to beneﬁt.
11  Derman, Bill, Lahiff, Edward and Sjaastad, Espen. 2006. Strategic questions about strategic partners: Challenges and pitfalls in South Africa’s new model of land 
restitution. Paper presented to the Land, Memory, Reconstruction and Justice Conference, Cape Town, 13-15 September 2006.
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The emerging evidence from Levubu suggests that the key 
policy shift represented by the adoption of the strategic 
partnership model is away from land access by claimants and 
towards the maintenance of agricultural productivity within 
a ‘commercial’ context. Indeed, land access for beneﬁciaries 
has gone from virtually unlimited, as in claims adjacent 
to Levubu settled just a few years earlier, to virtually nil. 
Beneﬁts, therefore, are almost entirely indirect, in the form 
of rents or dividends. In stark contrast to situations where 
individuals have direct access to land for their own use, 
beneﬁts accrue to the community (or structures representing 
the community), meaning that the allocation of beneﬁts to 
individuals (if this is even attempted) is entirely through 
collective processes, with all the risks and contestation that 
this implies. 
To a large extent, the creation of strategic partnerships 
is viewed as the ‘solution’ to post-settlement support in 
areas such as Levubu. Strategic partners, through their 
agreements with the claimant communities, become 
responsible for development of economic activity on the 
restored land, including the provision of working capital 
and the provision of training for community members. Yet 
the needs of claimant communities – not least their land 
needs – are not necessarily going to be met in full through 
these partnerships. Substantial support may be required in 
monitoring the performance of the new joint ventures in 
order to protect the interests of claimants. CPIs are likely 
to require extensive support in terms of capacity building, 
business advice, monitoring of compliance with the terms 
of settlement agreements, dispute resolution and the like. 
It is far from clear where such support will come from, or 
what will be the precise role of the CRLR or other agencies 
in the future provision of post settlement support. To a large 
extent, post-settlement support at Levubu has effectively 
been privatised.
Under the strategic partnership model, individual land rights 
do not include land access, being reduced to an ‘undivided 
share’ in a property which is leased to an entity that is, 
effectively, beyond the control not only of the individual but 
even of the group for the duration of the contract. In this 
respect, it is difﬁcult to see how the strategic partnership 
model promotes the land rights of claimants. 
The social, political and economic factors inﬂuencing the 
South African restitution process today suggest that some 
variant of the strategic partnership model is likely to be 
implemented across most claims on high-value agricultural 
land for the foreseeable future. While the emerging model 
at Levubu is far from ideal, especially from the perspective 
of poor and unemployed community members, there 
is scope for improving it. Probably the most important 
modiﬁcation, and one that would bring most immediate 
beneﬁt to the most people, would be to allow for limited 
settlement (combining both housing and small-scale 
production) on non-core agricultural land, up to an agreed 
limit. A greater emphasis on training of beneﬁciaries in 
farm management, business management and corporate 
and marketing activities, including more speciﬁc targets in 
terms of numbers training and timescales, would also help. 
Communities need to be given greater power to terminate 
agreements and assume control of operating companies 
after ten years, or an extended period of their own choice, 
without being obliged to immediately repay all debts owed 
to the strategic partner. Finally, there is a need for the state 
to play a more active role in monitoring the performance 
of both operating companies and community leaders with 
regard to business decisions and the distribution of beneﬁts, 
particularly when it comes to protecting the interests of poor 
and marginalised members. Above all, emerging models of 
restitution must deliver signiﬁcant material beneﬁts and 
real rights in land if they are to be sustainable and meet 
their constitutional obligations.
Outside of agriculture, strategic partnerships and other 
contractual arrangements have emerged across a range of 
sectors under the restitution programme – most notably 
forestry, eco-tourism and mining. Many of the issues 
discussed with regard to agriculture are also relevant to 
other sectors, but there are some important differences. 
A common feature is that they effectively exclude the 
claimant community from direct control of (and often 
access to) the resource, substituting the promise of a ﬂow of 
indirect beneﬁts, in the form of cash income, employment 
opportunities or development assistance. The available 
evidence suggests that recurring problems with this model 
include difﬁculties faced by communities in understanding 
complex technical or ﬁnancial matters, below-expected 
or delayed sharing of beneﬁts with community partners, 
and a tendency on the part of community leadership to 
be co-opted by strategic partners, leaving the majority of 
community members poorly informed as to the progress of 
the venture and the beneﬁts to which they are entitled.
Despite the many claims on commercial forestry land, 
relatively few have been settled to date and few joint 
ventures in forestry have been reported. At Khambule, in 
KwaZulu-Natal, the claimant community is considering 
a joint venture with a private forestry company, which 
will rent an established forestry plantation from the 
community for the sizable sum of R600,000 per annum (for 
a community of 80 households). The private partner is the 
former landowner, and the community would appear to 
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have been put under considerable pressure to allow this 
company, RF Gevers (Pty) Ltd, to lease the land for a further 
30 years. This would appear to be much longer than many 
community members would wish, as they desire to use 
the land for grazing and cropping purposes. Suggestions 
have also been made that the community could buy into 
the forestry company over time, but it is not clear how 
realistic a prospect this is. Due to delays in transfer of the 
title deed, however, no rental had actually been paid to the 
community at the time of research by CASE (August 2005), 
despite the forestry business continuing as usual for more 
than a year after the Settlement Agreement was signed. As 
with many other joint ventures, the Khambule case would 
appear to put the community at a disadvantage, as they are 
obliged to accept as partner an established company, which 
will effectively retain control of the land for a prolonged 
period while community members will be prevented from 
using the land in their preferred manner. As in other cases, 
the challenge will be to ensure that rental income, once it 
materialises, actually ﬂows to community members in a 
transparent manner, and that concerted efforts are made to 
address the continuing land needs of members.
The Klipgat restitution claim offers an example of a joint 
venture in the mining industry, and highlights the difﬁculties 
and risks involved in making such a partnership work to the 
beneﬁt of the community. As reported in the Sustainable 
Development Consortium Diagnostic Study for Klipgat, 
the community has entered into a highly complicated 
shareholding agreement with Etruscan Diamonds (Pty) 
Ltd. Community members expressed great frustration 
at the complexity of the deal, which they struggled 
to understand, and with the apparent lack of beneﬁts 
ﬂowing to the community, despite active mining of alluvial 
diamonds on their land. Poor communication between 
community members and their own leadership, and a lack 
of transparency with regard to community funds, appear 
to have exacerbated the problem. Another critical factor 
was the lack of any input by the Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs or other competent authority into the 
complex deal negotiated between the Klipgat community 
and Etruscan, or any subsequent monitoring of the contact 
by the RLCC or other body. As in many other cases, the focus 
on the joint venture has served to distract attention from 
the other pressing land and livelihood needs of community 
members, which remain largely unaddressed. This recurring 
failure to translate seemingly lucrative commercial 
propositions into material beneﬁts for community members 
within a reasonable time frame is clearly undermining the 
developmental and restorative elements of restitution, 
is likely to cause divisions within communities and, over 
time, is likely to undermine support for the joint ventures 
concerned, which should be a cause for concern for the 
strategic partners and for all stakeholders in the restitution 
process.
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Within the ﬁeld of eco-tourism, the Makuleke claim in 
Limpopo is generally held up as a success story, and 
rightfully so. The community has entered into partnerships 
with South African National Parks (SANParks) for the lease 
of a portion of land that falls within the Kruger National 
Park, and with two private companies for the construction 
and operation of the Outpost and Wilderness game lodges, 
with up to ﬁve more lodges in the planning stage. What 
distinguishes the Makuleke claim from many others is the 
agreement that community members may make sustainable 
use of natural resources in their area, even within the nature 
reserve, through hunting and gathering. Furthermore, the 
joint ventures entered into with both state and private 
agencies are not exclusive, as they allow the community the 
freedom to initiate other ventures, either alone or with the 
partners of their choice. Such measure allow for a greater 
diversity of beneﬁts to community members, in both the 
shorter and longer terms, than the exclusive (‘one size ﬁts 
all’) model typically being applied in joint ventures. Material 
beneﬁts that have accrued to the Makuleke community 
have included preferential employment of community 
members, during both the construction phase and 
subsequent operation of the game lodges, employment 
as game rangers, funding for community development, 
including electriﬁcation of two villages and construction 
of four classrooms in village schools, educational bursaries, 
funding for small business development in ﬁelds such as 
craft, textile and cultural performance, as well as training in 
a wide range of professional and business skills. 
A number of factors can be identiﬁed which appear to 
have contributed to the relative success of this series of the 
Makuleke ventures:
• location on a valuable resource, part of a world-famous 
eco-tourism site
• involvement by SANParks, a dynamic national agency
• close involvement of the Minister of Agriculture and 
Land Affairs
• close involvement by a wide range of NGOs and 
other support agencies, possibly unprecedented in 
restitution to date
• settlement of the claim via the Land Claims Court, 
which may have resulted in a more detailed and 
enforceable agreement than is typically associated 
with administratively negotiated settlements (i.e. 
Section 42D)
• generous support from a range of state agencies
• a well-organised and dynamic CPA.
By contrast, at Dwesa-Cwebe in the Eastern Cape, plans 
to lease the nature reserves to Eastern Cape Nature 
Conservation have led to little concrete development ﬁve 
years after the formal settlement of the claim, due to delays 
in transfer of land title and lack of clarity around the use of 
dues to be transferred to the community trust. In this case, 
once again, a community which is entitled to restitution is 
being hampered by a relatively complicated deal, mainly 
involving state agencies, which cannot be resolved by 
the community alone but requires active support and 
co-operation from a range of bodies, which has not been 
forthcoming to date. In the meantime, the other pressing 
developmental and land needs of households in the 
community remain largely unaddressed. Clearly, multi-party 
deals in the context of restitution require a competent and 
committed authority to oversee contractual negotiations, 
ensure that they are completed and implemented within a 
reasonable time frame and monitor the compliance of all 
parties over the longer term. 
Overall, this range of experiences in joint ventures highlights 
the difﬁculties faced by communities in obtaining beneﬁts 
from complex commercial deals and the intensive support 
required to make them work. Nonetheless, examples 
such as Zebediela and Makuleke show that much can 
be achieved if conditions are favourable.
Photo: Marc Wegerif
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3. Conclusions and policy 
recommendations
This paper has shown how a wide range of business models 
are being applied in land reform The choice of model will 
clearly depend on a range of factors, and is open to inﬂuence 
by a range of actors, not all of whom necessarily share the 
consequences.
One set of choices is between individual or group use. Closely 
related to this is the choice of whether to ‘go it alone’ (either 
as a group or as individuals) or to enter into some form 
of partnership with an external party. Another axis along 
which a community may position itself runs from ‘low-input, 
low-output’ to ‘high-input, high-output’. This in turn will be 
inﬂuenced by the type of land asset involved, and the scale 
of skills and resources available to members to bring their 
land in to production. It is also important to consider the 
element of risk, as different options carry different degrees 
of risk, and poor communities may be better advised to err 
of the side of caution rather than choose options that might 
promise higher returns but involve a greater degree of risk. 
For new landholders, making the ‘right’ (or best, or most 
appropriate or most sustainable) choice can never be a simple 
process, and will depend on a range of internal and external 
factors – the differing interests and opinions of members 
of the group, its internal organisation and coherence, the 
assets at its disposal, the availability of potential partners, 
any conditions imposed as part of a Settlement Agreement 
and so on. What may be appropriate for one community or 
group may well be highly inappropriate for another. What 
we can draw from the available evidence, however, is that 
the processes surrounding the choice and implementation 
of speciﬁc models appear to be often inadequate, so that 
even where seemingly rational choices are made the results 
are rarely as expected. Moreover, it would appear that 
many choices are unduly inﬂuenced by external agencies 
(including the CRLR), whether in promoting ‘commercial’ 
models of agriculture or imposing strategic partners 
in a manner that leaves little room for negotiation and 
marginalises many of the intended beneﬁciaries. 
At the outset of this paper, it was argued that the concept 
of business model has two main dimensions: the type of 
land-use and the socio-economic arrangements associated 
with it. In order to improve the effectiveness of business 
models in restitution, both of these dimensions will have to 
be addressed. 
On the one hand, this will require a more effective use of 
formal business planning. It is clear from the available 
evidence that the aspirations expressed in settlement 
agreements, CPI constitutions and business plans are rarely 
given sufﬁcient attention and follow-up in order to turn 
them into sustainable enterprises, even where professional 
planners are employed. This relates, in part, to the complex 
nature of planning the use of an extensive resource (land) 
for multiple purposes, and the expected involvement of 
multiple agencies in provision of support over an extended 
period. This in turn points to the need for effective project 
management of the entire settlement planning and 
implementation process, which clearly is not being played 
by the CRLR in most restitution cases. The settlement 
process has proven to be a lengthy one, often exceeding ﬁve 
years, and it is imperative that a single, competent agency 
be involved to support communities and co-ordinate the 
contribution of other parties over this period.
While formal business planning processes are important, 
they must also be in tune with the social and economic 
realities of claimant communities or landless people. Many 
communities are made up of predominantly poor people, 
lacking in business experience, and vary enormously in the 
level of internal organisation, coherence and leadership. A 
holistic planning process should work with the community 
as it actually exists, rather than how it might be imagined 
as a single, entrepreneurial entity. In addition, adequate 
attention must be paid during the planning proccess to 
building the capacity of community structures over time. 
A number of critical areas can be identiﬁed that will require 
attention if more realistic and effective business models are 
to be developed, as follows:
• Realistic assessment of the needs of community 
members, including socio-economic status, skills, 
current livelihood activities and aspirations for the 
short and longer term.
• Capacity building within communities to develop 
leadership skills, promote effective and accountable 
leadership and encourage the widest possible 
participation in decision-making processes.
• Development of a variety of land-use options, ranging 
from ‘low-risk, low-investment, low-return’ to ‘high-
risk, high-investment, high-return’, and including both 
collective and individual options. Where possible, 
a number of options should be allowed to co-exist, 
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allowing for different individuals or sub-groups within 
communities to proceed in different directions and 
at different paces, depending on their particular 
circumstances. This may require a greater separation 
between landholding entities (for example, CPAs), 
which represent the interests of all members, and the 
business entities engaged in various activities that 
occur on the land.
• Greater attention to the distribution of beneﬁts – 
including land access, cash income and employment 
opportunities – particularly within collective models 
such as strategic partnerships, support for CPIs 
and external monitoring of distributions within 
communities over time.
At this point in the history of South Africa’s land reform 
programme, there is clearly a need for a thorough 
reﬂection on what has worked and what has not in the 
post-settlement phase, and what more can be done to 
ensure that the anticipated beneﬁts ﬂow to the intended 
beneﬁciaries. Getting the land-use model right will never 
be a straightforward process. It needs to be approached 
in a ﬂexible and creative manner from the earliest stages 
of the planning process, be proceeded with cautiously and 
be adapted to changing circumstances and experiential 
learning. While obtaining the maximum possible beneﬁts 
for intended beneﬁciaries should be an ideal, this should 
not involve exposing people to unacceptable levels of risk 
or downplaying their stated preferences. 
It may also be necessary to seek a greater separation between 
landholding entities and the activities that occur on the 
land. Up to now, there has been a widespread assumption 
that CPIs will control all activities on the land they hold, and 
that all members will be equally involved. There is a need to 
explore ways in which landholding entities can focus more 
on functions of landownership and distribution of beneﬁts 
among members, while decentralising operational matters 
to its members, possibly in various combinations and in 
partnerships with external parties. 
It is not just the gross value of enterprises that is important, 
but the net value that ﬂows to community members and the 
manner in which this is distributed among them. Experience 
from restitution, in particular, demonstrates clearly that 
single (unitary) solutions may not meet the needs of all 
members, particularly where large and heterogeneous 
groups are concerned, and a strong argument can be 
made for encouraging multiple activities that maximise 
the involvement of, and beneﬁts to, the greatest possible 
number of people. Such pluri-activity may be more effective 
in delivering beneﬁts in the short term – of particular 
importance to the very poor – so that people are not 
required to wait excessively for beneﬁts to materialise. 
It is not appropriate here to prescribe how speciﬁc land reform 
projects – whether arising from restitution or redistribution 
– should be structured. The four recommendations set out 
above, however, offer a starting point, and much further 
debate and elaboration of proposals will be required both 
for individual projects and for the policies and institutions 
that guide the process. More elaborate, risky and capital-
intensive ventures – of the kind that are now being 
attempted within restitution – should not be discounted, 
but will clearly require a level of external support that has 
not been evident within the land reform programme to 
date if they are to deliver the expected beneﬁts.
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